Article

The Burden of Proof Belongs With Those Holding Power

16 November 2026

People facing deportation are being asked to entrust their future to a decision they may have little power to resist. When they say the destination holds something they fear as enslavement, the question becomes painfully practical: whose uncertainty will count, and who will have to live with the mistake?

The Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention carries a report that Uyghurs facing deportation by Thailand fear being treated as slaves in China. The supplied reporting does not establish what will happen to them, or whether the threatened deportation has taken place. Their expressed fear is nevertheless the reason to examine the decision, rather than something that can responsibly be set aside until harm is proved.

There is a peculiar demand we sometimes make of vulnerable people. We ask them to establish the future with a certainty we would never require when protecting ourselves. Yet the consequences of being wrong are not shared equally. An official may have to reconsider a judgement. A person returned to danger may lose the practical means of challenging anything at all.

That imbalance should determine where the burden of justification falls. When an authority proposes an action that could expose someone to grave and irreversible harm, uncertainty is a reason for restraint and further scrutiny. It cannot simply become permission to proceed.

The obvious objection matters. Governments cannot treat every feared outcome as an established fact. They have decisions to make, competing responsibilities and claims to assess. A person’s fear does not settle every factual question.

But taking testimony seriously does not require surrendering judgement. It requires doing the work: examining the grounds for fear, allowing a meaningful challenge, and asking whether any promised safeguard could actually protect the person once the decision has been carried out.

For an evolving philosophy concerned with how we live together, this reaches beyond borders. Responsibility becomes rather thin if those exercising power need only follow a procedure, while those subjected to it must bear every consequence.

Before sending someone away, the people authorising that departure should be able to explain why it is safe to do so. The person at risk should not have to suffer the outcome to demonstrate that the explanation was inadequate.