Article

Protection Must Leave Room for Political Disagreement

17 November 2026

A Jewish person should not have to answer for the actions of Israel before their neighbours take a threat against them seriously. A Palestinian should not have to abandon criticism of Israel before their own rights become discussable. Once protection depends on passing a political test, people have already lost something they were supposed to possess simply by being human.

Sydney Criminal Lawyers has published an argument for an Australian Human Rights Act, presenting the antisemitism envoy’s approach as favouring Israel at the expense of rights. That is the publication’s characterisation. The supplied reporting does not establish the detail of the proposals or their likely effects, so it cannot settle whether that criticism is fair. It does, however, bring a difficult distinction into view: protecting people from hatred and protecting a state from criticism are different undertakings.

The distinction requires care. Political language can carry antisemitic hostility. Calling something criticism does not make it innocent, and someone facing intimidation should not have to sit through an abstract discussion of free expression before anyone offers help.

Yet the difficulty of drawing a boundary is no justification for allowing it to disappear. We need to examine what is actually said or done, who is threatened, and what restriction is being proposed. Otherwise, a person can find their argument judged through their presumed allegiance rather than its content.

A human rights law would deserve the same scrutiny. Its reassuring name would not establish that every provision was wise. Would it give someone a meaningful way to challenge an unjust restriction? Could an unpopular speaker use it? Would it protect someone whose politics its strongest supporters find objectionable? Those are practical questions about what happens when a complaint reaches an institution with power to act.

For an open philosophy concerned with how we live together, this is uncomfortable work. We inherit loyalties, fears and accounts of history; some are deeply bound up with real suffering. We still have to decide what authority those inheritances should have over somebody else’s freedom.

The obligation is to take a threat seriously without automatically accepting every proposed remedy. People need protection that works. They also need the freedom to dispute what is being done in their name, including when the stated purpose is their protection.