Article

Fraud Should Not Make Trust a Personal Failing

28 October 2026

Someone who has been deceived can find themselves facing a second accusation: they should have known better. The loss becomes evidence against their judgement. Before long, the person who lied has almost disappeared from the conversation, while the person who believed them is expected to explain themselves.

There is something worth resisting here. A workable life requires us to believe other people some of the time. We cannot independently investigate every promise, every introduction, every apparent offer of help. Treating trust as a personal defect asks people to become incapable of the very thing that makes living together possible.

Genocide Watch’s special report on cyber scam operations in Southeast Asia brings that problem into view. The supplied reporting identifies the subject, but does not establish the circumstances of particular operations or the people involved. It would be irresponsible to fill those gaps with imagined victims, motives or outcomes. The ethical problem of deception, however, deserves attention without those additions.

An obvious objection is that people do need to be careful. They do. A warning that prevents someone losing money has practical value, and there is nothing humane about discouraging sensible checks.

The difficulty begins when advice about caution becomes our whole answer. “Be more vigilant” can quietly transfer the burden of preventing wrongdoing onto everyone who might suffer from it. Taken far enough, it offers a peculiar vision of progress: a society in which everybody must suspect everybody else, and those who fail to do so have only themselves to blame.

That is a poor ambition for a human future.

Responsibility should follow the capacity to act. Individuals can check an unexpected request. Organisations that carry communications or payments can be asked what safeguards they provide and how someone obtains help when those safeguards fail. Neither question excuses the deceiver.

And when someone admits they have been fooled, our first response matters. If disclosure brings humiliation, we make silence more attractive. We should want people to be able to say, plainly and promptly, “I believed them,” without having to defend their right to be helped.