Article

A Law Worth Having Must Constrain Our Own Side

13 October 2026

For someone whose family is in danger, the promise that justice will eventually be done can be a painfully inadequate offer. Eventually is a long time when help is needed now. Yet abandoning the attempt to place human conduct under law leaves that family dependent on the goodwill of whoever has power over them. There is little security in that arrangement.

The difficult proposition is that international law deserves our support even when it restrains people, governments or causes with which we identify. Otherwise, what we are supporting is permission for our own side, dressed in more respectable language.

The Guardian’s report of 9 October 2026 says that Navi Pillay, the former UN human rights chief, has been awarded the Nobel peace prize for her work advancing international law. It describes her as serving as a judge at the International Court of Justice and as having chaired the UN commission which concluded that Israel was guilty of genocide in Gaza. The report attributes to the Nobel committee the view that legal measures can help prevent war and violence.

These are claims in the supplied reporting, rather than independently confirmed facts here. A commission’s conclusion should also not be silently converted into a court judgment. The distinction matters, especially when the language carries such grave consequences.

But the ethical issue opened by the report reaches beyond the award. How much restraint are we willing to accept when restraint becomes inconvenient?

Most of us find it relatively easy to recognise the need for rules when we imagine ourselves as the person needing protection. The exercise becomes less comfortable when we imagine ourselves as the person being prevented from doing something. We may feel justified. We may have been harmed. We may believe that the other side has forfeited any claim to consideration.

Law becomes important precisely at that point. A rule which disappears whenever someone feels sufficiently justified offers very little protection, because justification is something human beings produce in extraordinary quantities.

There is an obvious objection. Institutions can be mistaken. Legal proceedings can be slow, selective or vulnerable to political pressure. A person waiting for protection cannot live on the reassurance that the correct procedure is being followed somewhere.

That objection has force. Reverence for an institution can become another way of avoiding responsibility. An award does not establish the truth of every conclusion reached by its recipient, and legal authority should remain open to scrutiny. Evidence, jurisdiction and the opportunity to answer allegations matter. Treating those requirements as irritating obstacles would undermine the very restraint being defended.

Still, institutional fallibility does not make unrestricted power a safer alternative. It gives us work to do: examining decisions, demanding reasons, insisting that comparable conduct receives comparable scrutiny. The question is whether criticism aims to improve a shared constraint or merely remove it from our own path.

For an open philosophy concerned with how people live together, this is a practical test of belief. We inherit loyalties before we have properly examined them. Those loyalties can help us care, but they can also decide whose fear seems credible and whose suffering requires further explanation.

We cannot settle every international dispute from a distance. We can refuse to make allegiance our standard of evidence. We can distinguish an allegation from a finding, and a finding from a judgment, without using those distinctions to dismiss the people whose lives are at stake.

The person needing protection should not have to win our affection before the rules apply. And when those rules constrain someone we support, that is the moment our commitment acquires a cost. It is also the moment we discover whether we meant it.